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Abstract: Recent interest in philosophy of religion on religious practice more 
generally, and liturgical rituals in particular, opens up new avenues for 
thinking about the religious lives of young children. In this article I consider 
what it means to say that young children are part of a worshipping assembly, 
and in what ways they might count as exemplary religious practitioners. 
There is very little discussion of the religious experiences and practices of 
children in the philosophy of religion, and I argue that this lacuna should be 
addressed. Taking cues from Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo's 
work on the philosophy of liturgy, I make the case that young children can 
and do participate fully in the liturgical rituals of Christian communities. I 
draw on the work of religious educators Sofia Cavaletti and Jerome Berryman 
to illustrate what the religious world of the child looks like, and to make the 
case that there are respects in which children are at an advantage over adults 
in participating in the liturgical life of the church. 
 





How should we understand the Gospel passages where Jesus tells his disciples that 
in order to see the kingdom of heaven, they must enter like little children?1 Early 
commentators interpreted stories of Jesus’ interactions with children as proposing 
 
1 See Matthew 18:3. See also and Luke 9:48. 




childlike traits like trust, humility, or innocence as worthy of imitation by adults.2 
Contemporary interpreters suggest that these stories have less to do with any 
characteristics of children themselves, and more to do with children’s low social 
status in Jesus’ day. Jesus was inverting social scripts to show that what matters in 
the eyes of the world is not necessarily what matters in the kingdom of God.3 I am 
not in a position to weigh in on the best way to interpret the texts, but inspired by 
them, I want to make a case for the importance of thinking about the religious lives 
of young children in philosophy of religion, especially in the budding area of 
philosophy of liturgy. There is much we can learn about the nature of religious 
experience and practice, and about some of the shortcomings of analytic philosophy 
of religion in general, by paying attention to religion’s youngest practitioners. I will 
make this case by focusing on the following two questions: what does it mean that 
young children are part of a worshipping assembly, and in what respects, if any, 
might children be exemplary as religious practitioners? 
Most religious people started out that way as children. The actual demographic 
story is far more complicated than this, of course, but among people who identify as 
religious in adulthood, the majority were raised in religious households.4 Though 
many people leave the religion of their youth in adulthood, or convert, or move this 
way or that into different religious denominations or streams, the truth is that the 
majority of people who are still religious as adults were socialized into religion 
starting early on. Religion is something people tend to grow up with, and if they 
remain, grow into; and the practice of religion looks very different across different 
phases of the lifecycle. However, there is virtually no attention to the religious belief 
or practice of children in analytic philosophy of religion.  
Recent interest among philosophers in the topic of religious practice more 
broadly, and in liturgical ritual in particular, opens up new avenues for thinking 
about the religious lives of the young. To explore those avenues, I will first highlight 
the difficulty in thinking of children as religious practitioners. I will then offer some 
 
2 See, for instance, Jerome and John Chrysostom’s glosses on Matthew 18:3 in the Catena Aura of 
Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas 2014)  
3 See, for instance, Craig Keener’s IVP Matthew Commentary (Keener 1997), Anna Case– Winters’ 
Matthew a Theological Commentary (220) (Case–Winters 2015). For an in–depth look at the figure of the 
child in the New Testament, See James M.M. Francis’ Adults as Children (Francis 2006). Francis 
considers interpretations of the sort I mention, but argues also for a third possibility, that childhood 
is an image of discipleship, and what Jesus meant to convey is the need for obedient reception of the 
Gospel message and radical change of heart, symbolized by the radical change that would be 
involved in becoming a little child again (147 ff). I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing my 
attention to Francis’ exhaustive study. 
4 (Pew Research Center 2016). 
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suggestions about why children are overlooked in philosophical treatments of 
religion, and give some reasons why we ought to pay more attention to the religious 
lives of the young. After that I will outline aspects of recent philosophical work on 
liturgical ritual from Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo that sheds light on 
how we might think of religious practice among children and connect themes from 
their work with reflections on the religious lives of children from two influential 
religious educators, Sofia Cavaletti and Jerome Berryman. I then draw on resources 
from developmental psychology on the imaginative play in early childhood to show 
what is unique about the way children participate in liturgy. My goal is to re–center 
philosophical discussions of liturgy on the smallest worshippers, for just a moment, 
to see how such a shift might deepen our understanding of the nature and purpose 
of liturgical rituals. Since this is unchartered territory in philosophy of religion, what 
I write here is just a first pass.  
Two caveats are in order. The first is that my focus is limited to Christian 
traditions, because those are the ones I know best, though I suspect that there are 
parallel lessons to be drawn from thinking about the religious lives of children in 
other faith traditions as well. I am intentionally drawing from an ecumenical range 
of Christian sources, though my own sensibilities about liturgy and religious 
education are no doubt shaped by my own tradition, Roman Catholicism.  
The second caveat is that I will restrict my attention to young children, for the 
most part between the ages of three and six. This might seem arbitrarily narrow, but 
there are two benefits to looking at children in this range. The first is that the 
religious educators I look to for thick descriptions of the religious lives of children 
work with children in these particular, formative years. The second benefit is that 
by looking to younger subjects, I am able to put more pressure on assumptions about 
the role of rationality and religious understanding in competent participation in 
liturgy than would be possible were I to consider older children and adolescents as 
well. 
 
2. Sharpening the Questions  
 
In some ways, thinking of young children as religious practitioners is fairly 
straightforward. Many young children say prayers, receive religious education, and 
go through various rites of initiation into their respective worshipping communities. 
They go to religious services just like anyone else (perhaps by their own choice, 
perhaps because their parents make them). As rates of religious disaffiliation 
continue to increase in North America and Europe, religious participation drops off 
for significant swaths of the population as children transition into adulthood, so for 




an increasing number of people, the experience of religious practice is limited to 
childhood.5 Furthermore, psychologists like Justin Barrett argue that children are 
primed to have religious beliefs, especially about the existence of a super–human 
agent responsible for the created world, regardless of whether they are brought up 
in religious households.6 If anything, children seem to be naturally spiritual, if not 
outright religious. 
On the other hand, there is something puzzling about the idea of the child as a 
religious practitioner in the context of the communal practice of religion, especially 
in the space of liturgical rituals. Liturgies consist of scripts that trade in highly 
idiomatic speech and gesture. Children often have a minimal grasp of the 
propositional content of what is being said, read, and sung in religious services. In 
early childhood they lack the ability to grasp the abstract concepts deployed in 
religious discourse. Their limited executive functioning makes it hard for them to 
sustain attention through a liturgy, and they can be restless, distracted, and in many 
cases rather distracting in liturgical space. It would seem that children and adults 
are doing very different things when they are gathered together as a worshipping 
assembly.  
Consider, however, the view of liturgical theologian, Alexander Schmemann, 
who says “Children penetrate more easily than adults into the world of ritual, of 
liturgical symbolism. They feel and appreciate the ‘atmosphere of worship.’ The 
experience of the Holy, of that ‘mysterium tremendum’ which is at the root of all 
religion…is more accessible to our children than it is to us” (Schmemann, 16). 
Likewise Sofia Cavaletti, speaking of the task of listening to the proclamation of the 
Gospel, says “Listening is the leaning toward others, the opening of ourselves in a 
receptive attitude toward the reality around us; it is only the capacity to listen that 
keeps us from revolving around ourselves. As for the child, we think that there is no 
age when the person is more capable of listening than in early childhood” (Cavaletti, 
49–50). 
Are Schmemann and Cavaletti right, that at least in some ways, children are at an 
advantage when it comes to participating in liturgy, or are they merely romanticizing 
childhood? The puzzle here can be expressed as a triad of premises, each initially 
plausible, but inconsistent when conjoined:  
 
(1) In order to participate meaningfully in liturgy, one must understand the 
propositional content of what is expressed in liturgy.  
 
5 To wit, many critics of religion call religion a childish stage that one must outgrow in order to be 
enlightened. For data on disaffiliation, see (Pew Research Center 2016, 2019) and (Bullivant 2019). 
6 (Barrett 2011). 
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(2) Children lack the requisite understanding of the propositional content of 
liturgies.  
(3) Children are exemplary participants in liturgy.  
 
There are a few ways to remove the inconsistency in the triad above. One would 
be to affirm each premise, but deny that children participate meaningfully in 
liturgical enactments, even if they are exemplars in some sense, which adults should 
nevertheless emulate. However, this deflates what is being claimed in (3). If there is 
some non–trivial respect in which children are better at worship than adults in some 
respects, or are uniquely disposed to worship well, then it seems their participation 
in communal worship is meaningful. One hallmark of liturgical activity is that it 
conveys meaning in ways that are centrally important for those who participate in 
it. Liturgy allows individuals and communities to make sense of who they are, who 
they take God to be, where they have come from, and what truths are most 
important. We should expect that children would be able to advance in these forms 
of understanding if they are in fact exemplary as worshippers.7 
The inconsistency could also be removed by rejecting one of the premises. The 
truth of (2) depends on what counts as the requisite level of understanding of 
propositional content. However, on its face (2) seems highly plausible. Liturgical 
speech and gesture are complex, and the propositional content of what is expressed 
in Christian liturgies is difficult to understand. Many of the assertions made in 
creeds, hymns, and prayers deal with abstractions and nuances beyond a young 
child’s comprehension. Yes, children can sometimes astonish us with profound 
insight into difficult questions. And as Cavaletti claims from her experience with 
children, “in the religious sphere, it is a fact that children know things no one has 
told them” (42). But what is important here is the comparative advantage adults 
would seem to have over children in general when it comes to understanding 
liturgy. After all, the puzzle is about the claim that adults should learn from children, 
and part of what generates perplexity is that children often understand so much less 
than adults.  
 
7 It would be helpful to have a more precise formulation of what I mean by “meaningful 
participation,” but I fear that the kinds of speech acts the constitute liturgical activity can be 
meaningful in numerous ways, making it difficult to find one definition that captures them all. Since 
I want to argue that liturgies allow participants to engage God in a second–personal way, the most 
salient kind of meaningfulness I am after is the kind that might characterize the sort of speech acts 
that transpire in interpersonal communication and the kind of knowledge one has as a result of such 
communication. The things I believe and say about my father are meaningful because they express 
what I take to be true about who my father was and how we related to one another, and our 
communication was meaningful because it carried significance and built genuine relationship.  




In my view, the best candidate to reject is premise (1). I will argue in what follows 
that the relationship between propositional understanding and meaningful 
participation is not so straightforward, and that one can participate meaningfully in 
a liturgy without understanding all of what is going on. I will also give some reason 
to doubt the truth of premise (2) by considering the role of early childhood religious 
education in the development of religious understanding. I will also make the case 
that premise (3) is literally true, and I will suggest some ways we might think of 
children as exemplary. But before I can present those reasons, I want to reflect some 
on the absence of attention to children in philosophy of religion and suggest some 
reasons why this problem should be rectified. 
 
3. Motivating a focus on Liturgy and Children 
 
Nicholas Wolterstorff and Terence Cuneo both puzzle over how little attention is 
paid in analytic philosophy of religion to one of the central features of religious life—
the practice of communal worship. As they see things, philosophers of religion seem 
most concerned with giving an account of the content and evidential status of 
religious belief, where belief is understood as assent to propositions about God and 
God’s relations to the world. Philosophy of Religion in the last four decades has been 
mostly preoccupied with questions about the metaphysical puzzles that arise from 
the claims of theism and the epistemology of religious belief, at least in the Anglo–
American context. What has been ignored, Wolterstorff and Cuneo point out, is the 
significance of religious practice itself. Cuneo raises the concern that,  
 
…much of the discussion in contemporary philosophy of religion is detached from 
the religious life in such a way that it threatens to offer a distorted picture of what is 
important to this way of life. A corollary is that contemporary philosophy of religion 
has largely failed to deepen our understanding of what it is to be a religiously 
committed agent and how one ought to be such an agent. A consequence, I believe, 
is that we do not understand crucial components of lived religious life as well as we 
should. (Cuneo 2016, 6)  
 
Ideally, religious people live out their belief systems by adhering to the ethic internal 
to their faith. And in addition to (or perhaps as part of) their ethical dimensions, 
religious traditions also call for what must seem to the alien observer a most 
puzzling pattern of behavior. Religious folk gather to engage in communal rituals 
of worship.  
Motivated by a desire to do justice to forms of religious life as they are actually 
lived, both Cuneo and Wolterstorff make the case that analytic philosophy of 
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religion can and ought to turn its attention to communal rituals of worship, to the 
subject of liturgy. They admirably demonstrate in their own treatment of the subject 
the philosophical fruit of such a turn. To their observation about the lacuna 
regarding religious practice, I would add that according to analytic philosophy of 
religion, the paradigmatic religious believer/practitioner is a neurotypical, rational, 
and probably highly educated adult. Perhaps focusing on the idealized rational 
agent is understandable for our advancing the epistemology of religion. However, 
limiting study in this way obscures the fact that the individuals filling places of 
worship the world over are incredibly diverse, intellectually and otherwise. This 
diversity raises interesting questions for the study of liturgy, as liturgy is both 
fundamentally communal and norm governed.  
Liturgical practice involves following norms laid out in liturgical scripts (more on 
that below), and the range of intellectual and physical abilities for satisfying those 
norms varies widely among any assembled group. To put it differently, there are 
‘rules’ for liturgy, and whether or not what a person says or does will count as 
appropriate liturgical participation will depend at least to some extent on whether 
they adhere to the rules. You have to have at least some sense of what you are doing, 
and why, in order to participate meaningfully in what is happening. It makes sense, 
then, to ask whether those in the assembly who are not idealized rational subjects 
somehow participate less fully in the worship of the gathered assembly. 
There are many reasons why it makes sense to focus on children in this context. 
The first, and what I hope would be most obvious, is that children are people and 
are valuable, and aspects of their religious lives are philosophically and 
theologically important in their own right. Too often we treat children as incomplete 
humans–in–progress, irrelevant to our explorations of question of philosophical and 
theological importance. If we intend to be more inclusive in the practice of 
philosophy of religion, we ought to pay attention to diversity of age and consider 
whether our assumptions about the relevance of children’s experiences reveal biases 
we have against the young.  
The second motivation for thinking about the religious lives of young children is 
the one mentioned in the introduction. Most Christians were made in Sunday School 
classrooms, confirmation classes, or backyard Bible clubs. Reading lots of 
philosophy of religion, one gets the impression that the average Christian is some 
blank slate of an adult who woke up one morning and converted upon reading the 
modal ontological argument for God’s existence. Or perhaps he looked across a 
beautiful vista and had his sensus divinitatis tickled, and voila, he became a Christian. 
But in reality, most people’s religious identities are formed over the gradual 
accumulation of lots of experiences, under the influence of members of their 




families, communities and peer groups, over a long span of time. So even if the 
primary goal of philosophy of religion were just to consider the rationality of 
religious belief, it would still make sense to pay attention to the realistic conditions 
under which religious commitments are actually formed.  
On a closely related note, it is hard to overstate how formative the experience of 
religion in childhood can be on an adult’s belief and practice, for better or for worse. 
For religious people introducing their own children and the children in their 
churches to their liturgical traditions, it is important to think hard about best 
practice. This is both a practical matter of considering what forms of pedagogy are 
best suited to the aims of helping children’s spiritual development, and also an 
ethical matter of considering how best to teach children in a way that respects their 
needs and autonomy and protects their welfare.8 And it is fair to ask whether we 
have the right in the first place to raise children religiously and initiate them into 
liturgical practices. Even if the answer is yes, that’s a position that needs a defense. 
Philosophical reflection on children’s experiences in this domain might go some 
way, at least, toward aiding these practical and ethical considerations. 
Finally, one consequence of widening the focus of philosophical attention to 
include both religious practice and children is that it increases space for reflective 
distance wherein philosophers of religion, especially in the analytic tradition, can 
reevaluate the extent to which our philosophical anthropology is dominated by 
concerns about rationality. My point is not that we must demote the importance of 
intellect and will in the way we conceive of the religious dimensions of human 
nature, but rather that we can consider ways in which other facets of our humanity 
might be neglected in our treatment of religion. Focusing on children allows just 
such an opportunity. What is important about religious life as it’s lived on the 
ground for those who do not or cannot (yet) think about God in abstract, symbolic 
terms? What role do affect and social perception play in the process of spiritual 
growth? Is it a mistake to think that the normal (and normative) trajectory of 
religious development in a person’s life is one of linear progress? The answers we 
might find to these questions could in turn shed light on how we understand the 
religious experiences of humans in other stages of life, as well as people of all ages 
with intellectual disabilities. 
 
8 I focus in this essay on religious education where things go well. This is a far more cheerful 
subject than what other scholars are very helpfully bringing to the table concerning the effects of 
childhood religious trauma. See Michelle Panchuk’s excellent and sobering work on this topic 
(Panchuk 2018). 
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4. Gleaning Insight from the new Philosophy of Liturgy  
 
In Acting Liturgically, Wolterstorff characterizes liturgy as a specific kind of 
communal scripted activity. The script provided by a liturgy tells participants what 
to do by giving a sequence of act–types that furnish the activity with normativity. 
The act–types are not just words that participants ought to say, but also gestures 
they should make and postures they should assume. It is a whole–bodied 
phenomenon. In liturgies, participants “keep silence, play musical instruments, 
stand, sit, kneel, bow, prostrate themselves, process, dance, get out of their seats and 
walk forward, return to their seats, cross themselves, fold their hands…” and so on 
(Wolterstorff, 25). The kinds of act–types spelled out in liturgies vary across 
traditions, but all forms of Christian worship, he claims, engage in liturgy. “This is 
true even of the Quakers on the Eastern Seaboard of the United States. Each person 
is to meditate in silence until he or she feels moved to by the Spirit to say or sing 
something; the others are to listen attentively” (12). 
What distinguishes liturgical activity from other kinds of communal scripted 
activity is its purpose. Liturgy is most closely associated with worshiping and 
adoring God, and involves other modes of engaging with God too, like listening and 
petitioning. According to Wolterstorff, “Christian liturgical enactments are for the 
purpose of learning and acknowledging the excellence of who God is and what God 
has done” (29). The kind of liturgical learning and acknowledgement he describes is 
not abstract or impersonal, but second–personal interaction with God. 
In following a liturgical script, a participant’s actions and words take on what 
Wolterstorff calls “counting–as” significance. “Raising one’s hand at a certain point 
in an auction counts as placing a bid on the item being auctioned,” Wolterstorff 
explains (23–24), and in like fashion, actions performed according to a liturgical 
script count as instances of various ways of engaging God. Bowing or kneeling count 
as acts of adoration, raising one’s hands can count as an act of thanking or 
supplicating God. Uttering a prayer can count as an act of confession, and so forth. 
A liturgical action counts as an instance of worship, in part, to the extent the 
participant is following the script.  
Because liturgical activity follows a script, participants lay aside their autonomy 
in a way, coming to the liturgy, “prepared to suspend for a time acting on their own 
judgments as to what would be good to do and instead follow the liturgical script” 
(Wolterstorff 18). One of the most important functions of such suspension of private 
judgment is that it allows a group of individuals to act together in concert. By setting 
aside their own plans for how to act in the communal space of the liturgy, 




participants are able to act collectively in learning and acknowledging the excellence 
of God.9  
One consequence of the collective nature of liturgical action is that knowledge 
about how best to perform what’s prescribed by a script, and what the various 
elements of the script even mean, is going to be distributed unevenly across the 
assembly. Wolterstorff argues though that just as lay people can rely on the expertise 
of scientists to certify the meaning of the scientific terms they employ, participants 
in the liturgy can likewise depend on liturgical experts to certify the meaning of 
elements of the liturgical script. Borrowing the notion of linguistic division of labor 
from Hilary Putnam, he explains  
 
There are members of the scientific community who know what a Higgs boson is. 
When I say to my wife, ‘Physicists have discovered the Higgs boson,’ the term ‘Higgs 
Boson’ stands for whatever it is that the experts refer to when they use that term. 
There is a division of linguistic labor between me and those experts in the use of the 
term ‘Higgs boson.” There is likewise a division of linguistic labor among those who 
are members of a liturgical tradition…. Liturgical traditions and their corresponding 
communities are paradigmatic examples of the division of linguistic labor. That 
makes it possible to perform acts of worship while having only the vaguest idea of 
what those acts are (43).  
 
He goes on to say that the participant who does not know the relevant liturgical 
idioms can expand and deepen her knowledge with practice and can “grow into the 
liturgy” (44). 
This process of “growing into the liturgy,” plays a prominent role in Terence 
Cuneo’s account of the kind of knowledge that is gained by participation in the 
liturgy. In Ritualized Faith, Cuneo argues that when someone participates in liturgy, 
the point is not to grow in propositional knowledge about God, but to grow in a 
special kind of practical know–how that is not reducible to propositional 
knowledge. One develops a certain kind of skill. Though the liturgy is not for the 
purpose of conveying this skill (it’s for the purpose of praising God), religious 
know–how is the natural product of participation in liturgy. What participants learn 
how to do in a liturgy, Cuneo argues, is how to engage God: how to bless God, 
 
9 In ceding authority to the liturgical scripts this way, participants acknowledge a sort of authority 
to the traditions out of which those scripts were developed. The source and kind of authority will 
vary across traditions according to their various ecclesiologies. In other words, different communities 
will have different stories to tell about why they ought to follow the scripts they do, and what it is 
that makes certain ways of worshiping better than others. I’m grateful to Mark Taylor for raising 
concerns about this issue.  
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entreat God, praise god, thanks God, confess to God, etc. In short, they are building 
up the means to be able to relate to God in a second–personal way.10  
Cuneo limits his discussion of liturgical know–how to what he calls competent 
participants, whom he describes as “those who are sufficiently familiar with the 
performance–plan of the liturgy and the character of the core narrative” (77). He 
doubts that young children are competent participants. He says,  
 
It is one thing to perform an action that counts as expressing thanks; it is another to 
know how to do so. In the context of Eastern liturgies, small children perform actions 
such as kissing a copy of the Gospels and eating the eucharistic meal. Arguably, in 
that context, their actions count as cases of offering thanks to God. But these children 
do not know how to thank God by kissing a copy often Gospels (158). 
 
Here Cuneo claims that it is possible for a child’s action to count as an act of 
thanksgiving, even if the child does not know how to give thanks. But why think 
that children do not know how to give thanks? Cuneo presumably thinks this 
because they lack knowledge of the performance–plan of the liturgy and the 
character of the core narrative. But this judgment, I would argue, might be hasty. 
First consider knowledge of the performance–plan. Developing liturgical know 
how is partly constituted by learning what goes on in a liturgical script and figuring 
out how to enact those speech and act types for oneself. As Wolterstorff explains, 
“Full participation in some liturgical enactment requires practical know–how: 
knowing how and when to perform the scripted actions. It’s not a know–how one is 
born with, nor is it a know–how one acquires automatically as one matures. It’s a 
learned know–how… To acquire the relevant know–how one has to be inducted into 
the social practice” (Wolterstorff 23). Children and adults must be taught how to do 
liturgy. 
Depending on the complexity of the liturgical forms in which one is participating, 
the learning curve can be more or less steep. You have to learn when to stand, when 
to kneel, and when to sit down. You have to learn when to raise your hands or dance, 
and when to be quiet and reflective. In my own experience of converting to 
Catholicism as an adult, I had to learn how to genuflect, how to far to bow before 
communion, and how far to stick my fingers into a holy water font. Children learn 
these things too. When my children were very young and learning how to make the 
 
10 Cuneo himself does not spell this out in terms of second–personal knowledge, except to say that 
what one learns is how to engage God, and it would be interesting to compare what he says about 
know–how more systematically with discussions of what is sometimes called Franciscan knowledge 
or knowledge of persons. 




sign of the cross, it was hard to tell if they were third base coaches flagging the 
runner on to second, or if they are inventing some new heresy about number of 
persons in the trinity. But they tried, and their actions looked at least something like 
what they saw others around them doing. I would argue children can have at least 
partial knowledge of the performance–plan of a liturgy, so long as they have 
sufficient experience attending liturgies. They might need prompting from the more 
experienced participants around them, but like most kinds of know–how, I would 
suggest that liturgical know–how comes in degrees.  
Besides just learning what to do and say at the right time in liturgical contexts, 
one must also grow in understanding of what is going on, and why. While I would 
concede that children have a weaker grasp of the character of the core narrative of 
Christianity than adults might, I think young children can and often do understand 
enough about what is happening in the liturgy, and the bigger story of which that 
liturgy is a part, to exhibit the relevant kind of know how. Consider the example 
Cuneo uses of kissing the Gospels as an instance of giving thanks. If the actions 
called for in the liturgical script are explained to children in terms they can 
understand, then why wouldn’t they know how to give thanks by kissing the 
Gospels? The Gospels are God’s words to God’s people, and God’s people are 
grateful that God speaks to them. We think that children know how to express 
gratitude in other contexts, sometimes by kissing their loved ones to say thanks. So 
why would an instance of kissing the Gospels to give thanks to God be any different? 
Describing the development of liturgical know–how in adults, Cuneo argues that 
the process involves a complex set of intellectual, affective, and volitional changes a 
person undergoes. Part of this transformation, Cuneo argues, is achieved through 
the narrative elements of liturgy. Many liturgies involve imaginative reenactments 
of stories from the Bible where congregants speak in the first person, as if they were 
present for various episodes in the life of Jesus. This is not mere play–acting. This 
process of taking up a vantage point from within a narrative in liturgical context 
allows a person to see themselves as part of the broader narrative of salvation 
history, and it shapes their understanding of their own lives as part of that broader 
narrative. Cuneo asks,  
 
What might be the purpose of immersing oneself in the core narrative in this way? 
The short answer, I believe, is that immersion in liturgical action is in the service of 
receptivity and appropriation. The dominant purpose of immersion is to let 
participants open themselves up to and appropriate the riches of the 
 narrative, often by identifying with its characters in such a way that they  construct 
and revise their narrative identities. (87) 
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By helping participants to receive and appropriate the core elements of the stories 
in liturgies, the narrative elements of liturgy become salient to the participants’ own 
life experience. But Cuneo notes, it can be difficult to allow oneself to be immersed 
in a narrative. “Needless to say, imaginative engagement of this sort does not come 
intuitively for many. Participating in liturgical reenactment is as much about 
training and conditioning as it is about competent engagement” (83–4). 
Participating in ritual transforms the participant, and it seems as though this 
transformation can fly under the radar, so to speak, of the participant’s awareness. 
Cuneo says, “Even when we are children, these rites often shape our sensibilities 
without our realizing it, helping us to associate God and God’s activity with the 
concrete, the particular, the material, the communal. …to the extent that these rites 
do this—so the assumption of the tradition seems to be—these actions could be the 
sort of thing that brings us into communion with God in ways that are difficult to 
articulate and that we sometimes do not understand” (203). The process begins, for 
many, in early childhood. Perhaps this explains why people’s experience of religion 
in childhood has such a profound impact on how they experience religion as adults. 
To summarize the insights from Wolterstorff and Cuneo’s analyses of liturgy, 
there are three main points that are applicable to the religious lives of young 
children. The first is that those in the assembly with limited understanding of what 
is going on can nevertheless perform those actions meaningfully because the 
counting–as significance of liturgical actions depends on the collective activity of the 
community. If children are observing the more knowledgeable people around them 
and imitating them, then the liturgical “experts” from whom they learn can certify 
the meaning of the children’s actions. Second, liturgical know–how is not something 
that is reducible to propositional knowledge, and furthermore, is about how to 
engage God, to have second–personal experience. That know–how is embodied, 
involving the whole person, and not just the capacity for abstract contemplation. 
Finally, narrative immersion is a crucial facet of liturgical know–how.  
 
5. Observing the Religious Lives of Small Children 
 
Whether or not children participate meaningfully in the liturgical lives of their 
churches is actually an empirical question. Philosophers and theologians might have 
experience being around children, and perhaps memories of their own childhood, 
which can fill in some of the needed empirical content for answering those 
questions. However, this kind of common–sense, anecdotal reflection on childhood 
has its limits. Thinking about the religious world of the child is an exercise in 




remembering what childhood was like, and more importantly, in empathetically 
engaging children to try to see things from their point of view. Both of those tasks 
involve the difficult work of trying to screen off our adult projections onto our earlier 
selves and onto the children we seek to understand. 
Here the work of Sofia Cavaletti and Jerome Berryman is helpful. Cavaletti was 
an Italian theologian and Hebrew bible scholar who, along with Gianna Gobbi, 
developed a Montessori Christian education program for young children called 
Catechesis of the Good Shepherd (CGS). Cavaletti’s model is now practiced in over 
65 countries, in thousands of Roman Catholic, Episcopal, and Orthodox churches. 
Berryman, one of Cavaletti’s students, went on to develop a similar model in the 
United States called Godly Play in the 1970’s. Godly play is now widely adopted in 
Protestant churches around the world and has even been adapted for use in Jewish 
communities as Torah Godly Play.  
My point in drawing from the work of Cavaletti and Berryman is not to endorse 
CGS or Godly Play as best practice, though I do think there is much to commend in 
both models. Rather, their writings are helpful because their models of religious 
education are child–focused and child–led and are explicitly aimed at initiating 
children into the liturgical life of the church. They do not think the task of religious 
education is to pass on a set of teachings to children or to create some sort of 
relationship between the child and God. As they see things, children already have a 
relationship God, and are capable to listening to God’s word alongside adults. The 
role of the adult catechist is to “proclaim a word that is not one’s own and assist the 
child the child’s potentialities, which in no way belong to oneself…There is a deep 
bond uniting God to the child, the Creator to his Creature; it is a bond that cannot 
be explained as the result of any human work, a bond with which no human should 
interfere” (Cavaletti 52). In other words, the adult teacher’s role is to listen to the 
word of God alongside children, and to try to stay out of the way of God’s work. 
Because children are seen in this way in these educational models, adults are 
thought to have much to learn from children, and children are given a special voice 
in their work. Berryman says, 
 
Ignoring children in the church is an unrealized defensive act. Children present a 
powerful challenge to what adults conceive of as spiritual maturity. Jesus was very 
forthright when speaking about this error, made by his disciples, as well as us. He 
said that if you want to become spiritually mature, you have to become like a child 
(Berryman, 8).  
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Since Berryman and Cavaletti have been so intentional about centering children’s 
voices in the church, they have gathered decades’ worth of records of children’s own 
words and artwork about their religious experiences. One promising avenue for 
future research would be to treat their records, especially Cavaletti’s classic, The 
Religious Potential of the Child, as something like sourcebooks for exploring the 
religious world of the young child.  
Both CGS and Godly Play are styled after the educational philosophy of Maria 
Montessori, who proposed that children learn best in child–centered environments 
that are carefully prepared in advance to facilitate children’s self–directed 
exploration of the learning material. Montessori herself noted that children have 
what she called a sensitive period for religion, before the age of six, and both 
Cavaletti and Berryman endeavored to develop means to create environments rich 
in religious symbolism in order to give children between the ages of three and six 
spaces in which they could encounter God. “The catechetical material is not 
designed to lead to abstraction, but to the vital knowledge of a concrete Person; it 
does not lead to the consideration of ideas, but to prayer” (Cavaletti 54). Encounter 
is the main goal.  
The Godly Play Room and the CGS atrium, as their respective classrooms are 
known, are quiet spaces where children complete works that present the core 
narratives of the Bible and the liturgical life of the church through hands–on 
activities. The CGS classroom is called the atrium because it is meant to be an 
intermediary space between the outside world and the church, where the child 
learns how to be immersed more fully in what is happening in the ritual activity of 
the church. But what happens in the Godly Play Room and CGS atrium is itself 
liturgical. The curricula prescribe a ritual script that involves reading of scripture, 
prayer, music, and time for doing various works on Biblical and Sacramental 
themes. The purpose of these rituals, to mirror Wolterstorff and Cuneo, is to aid in 
the learning and acknowledging the excellence of who God is and what God has 
done, and to allow children to develop know–how for engaging God.11  
Citing an example of an activity in the Godly Play room described by Montessori 
scholar, E.M. Standing, Berryman describes children polishing brass models of a 
paten and chalice, vessels used in the eucharistic rite. Berryman says of that work, 
“The first level is physical. The child is merely polishing. At the next level, the child 
realizes how this polishing preserves the beauty of the cup and plate and how this 
act helps care for the environment of the classroom. The third level is engaged when 
 
11 I think this point can easily generalize to most other forms of Christian religious education like 
Sunday School or Vacation Bible clubs too, even if CGS and Godly Play are more explicit about their 
liturgical character. 




the child consciously ponders the meaning of God’s presence in Holy Communion 
while polishing (51).” The very concrete action of polishing terminates in an occasion 
to contemplate God’s intimacy with God’s people.  
Cavaletti recounts a young boy who seemed fixated on a work involving pouring 
water in and out of a chalice, coming back to the same work over and over again. 
The catechist thought the boy was being lazy by repeating this one action over and 
over again, until she heard the boy say one day staring into the chalice, “a few drops 
of water and a lot of wine, because we must lose ourselves in Jesus” (Cavaletti 91). 
There the kid was having some kind of mystical experience and was able to express 
a deep mystery of the faith in language he did not get from his teachers, while adults 
thought he was just goofing off.  
In another work used in the CGS curriculum, children practice putting priestly 
vestments in different liturgical colors on small wooden crosses. The work parallels 
what the children do when they put away their own clothing at home, but also 
allows them to reflect on what the various colors of vestments stand for—the various 
seasons of the church year. But at some point, what emerges in the children’s 
consciousness – without verbal instruction from adults––is the image of the priest 
standing in persona Christi at the altar, since the priest’s garments are draped over a 
cross.  
Both CGS and Godly Play pay particular attention to parables, and Berryman and 
Cavaletti report that certain parables have emerged as being particularly attractive 
to children across their decades of teaching. Of perennial interest is the parable of 
the Good Shepherd. Cavaletti explains that the image of the Good Shepherd caring 
for the individual sheep strikes a deep chord in children. The parable is illustrated 
for the children with the help of a small model of a sheep pen, filled with wooden 
sheep, with a wooden shepherd at the center. One sheep is lost outside of the 
sheepfold, and the children take turns bringing the shepherd out to fetch the sheep 
and bring it back into the fence. The catechist is instructed not to tell the children that 
the shepherd is Jesus and that each one of the children is the beloved sheep. In 
general, catechists are instructed to keep their words to a minimum. And yet 
intuitively, the children joyfully make these connections on their own.  
 Cavaletti thinks this particular parable resonates so consistently with children 
because it speaks to their deeply felt needs for love and protection (44). Hans Urs 
von Baththasar makes a similar observation about the religious world of the young 
child, claiming “So it is with all other attributes native to children: all of them are 
modeled on the wholesome exchange of love between the primarily giving love of 
the mother and the primarily received love of the child.” (Balthasar 1988, 22). A 
child’s openness to receiving maternal love prefigures and tutors a natural openness 
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to divine love, and the child delights in playfully contemplating the signs and stories 
that convey that love to her.  
Cavaletti explains that is easy to miss the depth of what might be going on in 
children’s encounters with God, because evidence of that depth typically comes 
“with ephemeral moments, like a flash of light that shines vibrantly then fades 
away” (37). What happens in the heart and mind of the child is a mystery to the 
adult. She goes on to say “The fact that we are dealing with flashes does not 
invalidate their importance, because it is proper to the child to live at first in a 
discontinuous way the riches he possesses, which only gradually and through the 
aid of the environment later becomes a constant habitus in him” (ibid). 
This certainly resonates with what I have witnessed in my own children and 
godchildren in church. They alternate between fighting with each other for pew 
space, making weird noises with increasing volume to see if anyone around is 
looking, and then gazing in amazement at the elevated host. In between asking 
questions about matters irrelevant to the celebration of the mass, they insist I explain 
death to them when we recite the mystery of faith, or ask (very loudly) during the 
eucharistic prayer why only Jesus is present in the eucharist, and not Mary the 
mother of God, too. They ask theological questions at bedtime about the scripture 
they heard in church that I would have never guessed they had been thinking of 
through the day. They connect their emerging understanding of the finality of death 
with the songs and prayers of Holy Week and the baffling nature of the Resurrection.  
What seems clear enough from Berryman and Cavaletti’s writing is that children 
can understand far more than we might think. What they are able to access are the 
essentials of the faith, in developmentally appropriate terms. They may not be able 
to pick up on everything that happens in the rich liturgies of their churches, but there 
are, at least, flashes of comprehension, and what they comprehend is deeply 
personal and salient to their own life experiences. 
 
6. Resolving the Puzzle 
 
Now that I have outlined some of the insights about liturgy from Wolterstorff and 
Cuneo and presented a brief glimpse into the religious world of the young child, we 
are in position to return to the inconsistent triad presented in section II. I will review 
the initial challenge: 
 
(1) In order to participate meaningfully in liturgy, one must understand the  
propositional content of what is expressed in liturgy.  
(2) Children lack the requisite understanding of the propositional content of  





(3) Children are exemplary participants in liturgy. 
 
 
If Wolterstorff is right that a person can participate meaningfully in a liturgy, if 
her actions can have counting–as significance even if she has “only the vaguest idea” 
of what those actions are, then we have reason to reject premise (1). Furthermore, it 
seems plausible that a person can develop liturgical know–how even before he has 
grasped the propositional content of the liturgical script he is following, so long as 
he is performing the appropriate action types and has some grasp of the broader 
core narrative of which that particular rite is a part. And more importantly, since the 
end of developing know–how is engaging God, it also seems plausible that a person 
can engage with God second–personally even if her propositional knowledge about 
God is significantly limited. We think as much is possible in parallel cases of second–
person knowledge between human persons. A child can have profound knowledge 
of who his mother is even if he has limited or mistaken propositional knowledge 
about her.  
I also think that anecdotes that Cavaletti and Berryman share give us some reason 
to doubt premise (2). Children might not fully grasp the meaning of the statements 
in the Nicene Creed or the prayers in the Liturgy of the Hours or the Book of 
Common Prayer. By this I simply mean they might not have many of the words of 
those texts in their vocabularies, or they may not know what propositional content 
is ruled out as contrary to the positive affirmations expressed throughs creeds and 
prayers. However, children can understand the essential elements of the Gospel 
message. They can believe that God is real and has really entered into history in the 
ways described in the narrative elements of the liturgy.  
Furthermore, understanding isn’t something that one simply comes to possess 
like water poured into a bucket, but is rather an intellectual virtue that is cultivated 
and nurtured—both in children and adults. Part of the task of the catechist is to 
facilitate the development of this understanding in age–appropriate ways. In any 
event, it is easy to see how we might underestimate children’s understanding of 
their faith, especially as that understanding tends to manifest itself in flashes, as 
Cavaletti calls them. 
Finally, I think there are several respects in which we might see children as 
exemplary religious practitioners, so we have reasons to think that premise (3) is 
literally true. The first is that children are much better at narrative immersion than 
adults are. Children have a much easier time seeing themselves as part of the stories 
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they hear, like the parable of the Good Shepherd, and they lack the inhibitions adults 
might have about engaging imaginatively in worship.12  
One reason to think that children are better than adults at narrative immersion is 
that very young children are especially at home in the world of imaginative play. 
Developmental psychologists have long stressed the importance of imaginative play 
for the cognitive development of the child. One pioneer of research in this tradition, 
Lev Vygotsky, theorized that play is essential for the growth of the child because it 
allows the child to engage in activity that is intrinsically rewarding, which at the 
same time allows the young child to grow in self–regulation and the ability to 
discover meaning through her interaction with her peers (Vygotsky 2017).  
In his 1966 lecture, “Play and its role in the mental development of the child,” 
Vygotsky explains that imaginative play, where children take on particular roles and 
act out imaginary situations, is pleasurable only when children are able to stick to 
the rules internal to the roles that are undertaken. The child playing a mother must 
stick to the rules of maternal behavior. The child playing doctor must do the sorts of 
things that doctors do, and the child playing the patient has to act like someone in 
need of the doctor’s help. They must do so not because their parents or teachers tells 
them to, but because they want to. If children do not stick to the script, the imagined 
world does not work, and the game is not nearly as much fun. Anyone who has 
observed young children negotiating the roles and rules for playtime with each 
other knows that such planning is serious business, and often lasts longer than the 
game itself.   
Imaginative play serves as a scaffold that allows children to develop new skills in 
what Vygotsky calls the zone of proximal development—a context in which a child 
makes developmental advances that outstretch what he would accomplish outside 
of that context. “In play a child is always above his average age, above his daily 
behaviour; in play it is as though he were a head taller than himself. As in the focus 
of a magnifying glass, play contains all developmental tendencies in a condensed 
form; in play it is as though the child is trying to jump above the level of his normal 
behaviour” (18).  
To see what Vygotsky means by this, consider what he has to say about the 
development of self–regulation. What is remarkable about preschool aged children 
and imaginative play is that in the context of the game, children are much better at 
self–regulation than they are outside of that context. Children are much better at 
following rules and controlling their impulses within imagined scenarios than they 
 
12 Here the work of Amber Griffioen on the role of imagination in religious experience is very 
helpful (Griffioen 2016). 




are in real life ones because the rewards for playing games well are immediate, 
internal to the activity itself. Thus, as children engage in imaginative play, they gain 
agential control over themselves and are better able to explore various social roles 
and the ways that mutual understanding are negotiated in the give and take that 
happens between peers.  
Not only is imaginative play a zone of proximal development for self–regulation, 
but also for deepening the capacity to understand language and objects. In 
imaginative play children learn to separate objects from the words that signify them, 
and to use other objects to stand in the place of those objects. A stick can be a horse, 
a block can be a truck, a cup can be a stethoscope. In play, external things lose their 
motivating force. The child sees one thing but  
 
acts differently in relation to what he sees. Thus, a situation is reached in which the 
child begins to act independently of what he sees… Action in a situation that is not 
seen, but only conceived mentally in an imaginary field (i.e., an imaginary situation), 
teaches the child to guide his behaviour not only by immediate perception of objects 
or by the situation immediately affecting him but also by the  meaning of this 
situation. (Vygotsky, 12)  
 
Thus, a child’s ability to make sense of the world she inhabits is accelerated in the 
context of imaginative play.  
The period during which imaginative play features so prominently in typically 
developing children is the rather narrow window of the preschool years. This fits 
nicely with Montesorri’s hypothesis that there is a sensitive period for a child’s 
religious sensibilities in this window. Children learn through play and story, which 
dispose them to engage in narrative immersion with ease. If as Cuneo argues, 
narrative immersion allows participants to “open themselves up to and appropriate 
the riches of the narrative, often by identifying with its characters in such a way that 
they construct and revise their narrative identities,” ( Cuneo, 87) children would 
seem to have a natural advantage in these aspects of the liturgy. Recall that children 
immersed in the parable of the Good Shepherd can easily identify with the lost 
sheep, even without any prodding from the catechist.  
Vygotsky’s description of imaginative play and development in young children 
lends it itself to an admittedly speculative analogy that might lend more support to 
premise (3). Liturgical scripts might be a kind of scaffold for spiritual development, 
both for young children and for adults, and liturgies themselves a zone of proximal 
development. The unique context of communal worship might allow participants to 
gain know–how for engaging God that is otherwise much more difficult to attain in 
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other contexts. Just as the rules of imaginative play allow children to attain the goods 
intrinsic to play and grow affectively and intellectually, the norms laid out in 
liturgical scripts might play a very similar role in the participant’s ability to make 
sense of the world described in the narratives of the liturgy and to understand her 
place in that world by following the liturgical script.13 And children, it seems, have 
a leg up here. 
The second advantage, mentioned by Schmemann in the introduction, is that 
children seem to be much more comfortable living with mystery. So much of the 
world is mysterious to the child that they have a natural kind of epistemic humility 
just in virtue of their limited life experience. The child has an advantage over those 
adults who suppose that they have adequate grasp of the propositional content of 
liturgies, because those adults fail to see the limits of their own understanding. 
Cavaletti quotes Leo the Great, saying, “On the subject of divine things, he who 
believes he has already found does not find what he is looking for, and has searched 
in vain” (158). While children may exhibit over–confidence in some of their beliefs, 
it does seem that they are able to sit in contemplation of the mysteries of the faith, to 
ask questions over and over again, to hear the same stories, and to be open to the 
possibility that what they know of reality is not the whole story.  
Lastly, if young children do indeed have a critical period of religious sensitivity 
in early childhood as Montessori, Cavaletti, and their followers believe, and the 
experience of maternal love mediates early experiences of divine love as Balthasar 
suggests, then children might naturally be primed to be more receptive to encounter 
with the divine. Their felt needs for love and security incline their hearts to be open 
before God, ready for engaging God though simple acts of thanksgiving and praise. 
If children are exemplary as worshippers, at least in these ways, how should 
adults then emulate them? What practical steps can Christians take to follow Jesus’ 
exhortation to become like children? I would provisionally suggest that rather than 
trying to pick out particular childlike traits and work to inculcate the habits that 
manifest them, worshippers might have an easier time if they simply spend more 
time listening to children. If congregants pay attention to children, invite them to 
 
13 Some liturgical theologians of the last century stressed that liturgy itself is a form of play, insofar 
as there are no extrinsic goals to liturgy, and the rules of liturgical scripts open up a kind of freedom 
of contemplation for participants. See in particular Guardini (1935), Ratzinger (2000), and von 
Hildebrand (2016). Though I think this way of describing the character of liturgy is both helpful and 
apt, I want to avoid the playfulness of liturgy for present purposes because it brings up difficult 
questions concerning realism and fictionalism about religious discourse that complicate the account 
of liturgy I’ve sketched here. I am grateful to Eric Yang for helping me see how much thornier these 
issues are than I’d initially imagined.  




share what they are learning and experiencing in church, and focus on their needs 
in communal life, then aspects of the religious lives of young children might become 
contagious. Empathic engagement with children, and with all the diverse members 
of a worshipping assembly, can enrich each participants ability to enter into the 
richness of liturgical practice.  
In his study of the philosophical abilities of children, Gareth Matthews makes a 
similar point about the value of having conversations about deep matters with 
young children.  
 
The adult has a better command of the language than the child, and, latently anyway, 
a surer command of the concepts expressed in the language. But it is the child who 
has fresh eyes and ears for perplexity and incongruity. And children typically have 
a degree of candor and spontaneity that is hard for the adult to match. Since each 
party has something import ant to contribute, the inquiry can easily become a 
genuinely joint venture, something otherwise rather rare in adult encounters with 
children” (Matthews 1979, 368). 
 
Liturgical activity is similarly a joint venture. Welcoming the little children and 
becoming like them, I would suggest, are integrally connected. And perhaps, one 
must not only become like a little child (in some respects) to grow in spiritual 
maturity through the practice of liturgy, but theologians and philosophers of 
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